Critical Thinking about Nuclear Weapons by Pelopidas, Benoît
CRITICAL THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
Benoıˆt Pe´lopidas – 2010
Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda, by John Mueller. Oxford
University Press, 2009. 336 pages, $27.95.
Les armes nucle´aires: Mythes et re´alite´s [Nuclear Weapons: Myths and Realities], by Georges Le
Guelte. Actes Sud, 2009. 390 pages, t25.
KEYWORDS: Nuclear weapons; United States; Soviet Union; critical thinking; theory
At first glance, John Mueller’s Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al
Qaeda has little in common with Georges Le Guelte’s Les armes nucle´aires: Mythes
et re´alite´s [Nuclear Weapons: Myths and Realities]. In one book, a renowned professor
provides an analytical recollection of the excessive emphasis that U.S. politics and media
have given to nuclear weapons since 1945, an emphasis that was at best ineffective, at
worse counterproductive, and in any case cost a lot of money. Mueller’s critique strikes
tous azimuts (in every direction): assessing the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons,
their desirability, and the probability of their proliferation to states and non-state actors;
accounting for their role in history, their military utility as weapons, and as a deterrent; and
evaluating the efficacy of international sanctions, treaties, and agreements to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. Mueller’s book is fundamentally based on the idea that
definitions of ‘‘worst case’’ usually do not pay enough attention to effective casualties,
resulting in an overestimation in the assessment of an insurance policy.1
In the other book, a retired executive of the French Atomic Energy Commission and
former secretary of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
offers a political history of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals since the beginning of the
nuclear age. Le Guelte focuses on the bureaucratic struggles between three groups*
‘‘idealists,’’ ‘‘pragmatics,’’ and ‘‘extremists’’*that form coalitions advocating the produc-
tion of certain types of weapons with the ad hoc support of industry, scientists, military,
and public opinion. His main point: ‘‘From the moment when the arsenals became the
image of the supremacy of the country [in the early 1960s, in his argument] the doctrine
has become an abstract rhetoric, detached from the activities of the military. It has
attempted at giving an apparent coherence to the contradiction between the foreign
policy of the country and its armament policies.’’ Indeed, he argues that in the United
States the stated doctrine nearly never coincided with the actual arsenal, except when
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger formulated his doctrine of counterforce targeting
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on January 10, 1974. In 1954, the United States was even in a situation of conflicting
doctrines between the one approved by President Dwight Eisenhower in October 1953, a
second one supported by John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon in March 1954, and a third
one finally defended by Dulles in April 1954. In Moscow, the Soviet arsenal was shaped
strongly by the domestic rivalries between the Kremlin, the Communist Party, the arms
industry, and the military.
However, since ‘‘intellectual muscles . . . have rarely been used since the end of the
Cold War’’ regarding nuclear issues, these attempts at providing fresh critical insight into
our understanding of nuclear history are most welcome, and comparing the authors’
perspectives may be fruitful.2 Because the critical perspectives and political implications of
these two books are not always compatible, they allow one to delineate more accurately
the evolving modalities of thinking about nuclear weapons.3 Indeed, critical thinkers
should challenge the accepted causal relationships between phenomena, investigate
previously neglected or ‘‘unauthorized’’ problems, and possibly propose new political
perspectives.4 By doing so, they may move the divisions among the experts or create new
ones. Similarly, examining issues that the most critical experts (willing to be recognized as
such) do not challenge sheds light on what binds the community together in descriptive
and prescriptive terms.5
New Terms of the Debate on Military Nuclear Issues?
The radicality of the books’ critiques should be assessed while taking into account their
respective audiences, which are a priori national. Because Mueller is particularly
provocative, I will take his arguments as guiding principles of this review. He targets
abolitionists and counterproliferation advocates at the same time, debunking two of their
three common beliefs. Contrary to what they think, he argues, the exceptional destructive
capability of the nuclear weapon has been overestimated, and they are wrong to use
nuclear fear as a strategy or pedagogy. Those who believe in the necessity of nuclear
weapons as a deterrent tool fundamentally rely on the fear of retaliation, whereas those
who don’t focus more on the fear of an accidental nuclear launch that might lead to
nuclear war.6 Mueller aims to de-emphasize these two aspects and reaches something
close to nuclear insouciance associated with a critical stance in terms of budgetary
priorities and the counterproductive effects of counterproliferation policies: ‘‘Whatever
their impact on activist rhetoric, strategic theorizing, defense budgets and political
posturing, nuclear weapons have been a substantial waste of money and effort, do not
seem to have been terribly appealing to most States that do not have them, are out of
reach for terrorists, and are unlikely to materially shape our future. Sleep well.’’ For Mueller,
it is the culmination of a long reflection, released just after being awarded the
International Studies Association’s 2009 Susan Strange Award for challenging conventional
wisdom. In a way it is also a celebration: the twenty-first anniversary of his article of the
‘‘essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons.’’7
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Whereas many thinkers have considered that the utility of nuclear weapons as a
deterrent should be reconsidered in a post-Cold War world, Mueller has already affirmed
that post-World War II stability was established so that nuclear weapons were not critical
to preventing World War III. This second point is shared by Le Guelte, who insists that a
war between the two superpowers was materially impossible in the 1950s; their
ideological opposition dating back to 1917, he points out, never caused a war and did
not prevent them from fighting together against Nazi Germany. Such skepticism regarding
the need for nuclear weapons as deterrent has to be underscored in the French context.
Indeed, Le Guelte’s book is one of the rare essays in French on nuclear history in recent
years.8 Additionally, it goes against the so-called Gaullist consensus on the utility of
nuclear weapons as guarantors of nuclear peace, an idea that most critical thinkers saw as
outdated by the end of the Cold War, but which Le Guelte and Mueller were critical of
much earlier.9 ‘‘Deterrence is a bet or a belief. It is not a guarantee. It cannot be a policy,’’
concludes Le Guelte. However, he is anything but insouciant, worries about the fragility of
the contemporary nuclear nonproliferation regime, and considers proliferation to be a
major threat.
Both authors downplay the role of nuclear weapons in history and consider the
overestimation of the enemy’s nuclear arsenal and how that provided justifications and
motivations to increase one’s own arsenal. Their divergences suggest three things
concerning new terms of the debate around nuclear issues.
First, the debates about state and non-state nuclear proliferation, disarmament,
deterrence, and security are no longer seen as separate. Instead, they are all considered
from the perspective of the perceived properties and utility of this weapon system. Is it
seen as a winning weapon?10 A desirable one?11 A reachable one in terms of cost, as well
as technical and logistical capabilities?12 A deterrent?13 If so, what exactly does it deter?
Second, disarmament*not just arms control*now appears to be a political
possibility that cannot a priori be dismissed.14 This is much more salient in Le Guelte’s
book.
Third, however harsh Mueller’s critique, he spares one of the three points of
agreement between the abolitionists and the advocates of counterproliferation. ‘‘Judicious
efforts to further reduce the danger of an accidental nuclear detonation, like those
devoted to dissuading new states from acquiring nuclear weapons, are certainly justified,’’
he concedes. Preventing nuclear use remains undoubtedly the unanimous goal of people
working in this field, even when they downplay, as Mueller does, the effects of the
weapons.
Of course, because these books are quite recent, it remains to be seen whether the
community accepts the challenges and shifts that they propose.
Limited information, criticism, and the threat of ideology
The statements of nuclear experts*whether they are communicating a political stance or
an analysis*are seen as authoritative because of their origin. Moreover, a critical
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hypothesis (and a fortiori a theory), because it is critical and ‘‘original,’’ might be
considered as ‘‘interesting’’ by some groups. If members of these groups, mostly in the
media, are disposed for various reasons to agree with this idea, its ‘‘interesting’’ aspect will
soon be turned into a criterion of validity, and the hypothesis will spread all the quicker
because the media members will spread it to people with no ability to criticize its
implications.15
Taking into account these elements is all the more important because available
information is scarce in the nuclear field.16 Critical thinkers should be careful not to move
from one certainty to another just because the new one is opposed to conventional
wisdom. This movement was well described by Gaston Bachelard in his Formation of the
Scientific Mind as ‘‘bipolarity of errors.’’ What is relevant to this discussion is the tendency
Bachelard diagnosed: the scientific mind tends to escape from one error only to fall into its
exact opposite.17
In some cases, Mueller falls into this trap, even if he is more cautious in his
propositions*very didactically recapitulated in the last chapter*than in some of his
abrasive charges against conventional wisdom. There are three points on which he seems
to provide certainties, but he is at best walking on thin ice: the effects of nuclear
catastrophes, what he calls nuclear arms races, and nuclear security.18
Given that consequentialist thinking is insufficient to make catastrophes of an
unprecedented kind credible and therefore preventable, Mueller has to show that a
nuclear catastrophe would not be unprecedented, so that his consequentialist perspective
remains pertinent.19
He rightly underlines that total annihilation will not necessarily follow a first strike.
However, his assessment of the effects of radiation seems questionable. He states that the
Chernobyl accident ‘‘resulted in the death of less than 50 people, most of them
underprotected emergency workers.’’ Yet, this figures seems quite low, and authoritative
physicists Georges Charpak and Richard Garwin, to whom he refers for other purposes in
the book, recognize that ‘‘it is very difficult to come up with the exact number of
victims.’’20 Asserting certainty over the issue is inadequate.
As far as arms races are considered, Mueller provides a most welcome critique of
‘‘cascadology’’ but falls into an idea of negative arms races that relies on the same
assumptions of a tipping point and a chain reaction. He even suggests that armament and
disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and when the reasons for the first disappear,
the second occurs.
As for nuclear security, Mueller might be right to consider that future nuclear states
are ‘‘by far most likely’’ to behave as cautiously as current ones have done so far. In any
case, he neglects the many nuclear near misses described by Le Guelte, such as the
nuclear-armed Soviet submarine, hit by U.S. depth charges on October 27, 1962, during
the Cuban Missile Crisis.21 The three officers on board needed to agree for a nuclear
torpedo to be launched; only one did not. Mueller’s point is valid when he suggests that
securitization will always be incomplete. However, considering the risk of nuclear
accidents as acceptable is already a political option that should be considered as such.
He also neglects that the effects of fire have not only been underestimated, but also
ignored in U.S. calculations of nuclear weapons damage.22 Additionally, he overlooks some
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important distinctions like that between a taboo and a tradition of non-use, which is of
major importance in the debate about the possibility and sustainability of complete
nuclear disarmament.23
One of the ways to avoid the risk of what I called ideology or apodictic certainties is
to engage in critical discussions with opponents. However, the way Mueller frames his
classical argument of the ‘‘essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons’’ does not take into
account strong critiques that have been addressed over the last two decades.24 Even if he
modestly and carefully considers that his counterfactual is ‘‘more plausible’’ than the
nuclear peace hypothesis, the argument would have benefitted from the methodological
suggestions offered by Richard Ned Lebow, among others.25 Indeed, given the
interconnectedness of historical phenomena, he should have built a much more elaborate
counterfactual, instead of working with everything being equal. Of course, considering all
the other counterfactuals might have led to an infinite regress. However, because dis-
inventing nuclear weapons requires a massive rewriting of history, his argument would
have been strengthened by considering the most likely course of events that would have
unraveled his expected outcome*peace, in this case. This suggestion remains valid even
if one accepts Mueller’s point about the minimal effect of nuclear weapons on
international relations, because he himself recognizes the huge amount of money they
monopolized.
Hopefully these books will trigger a new generation of critical minds who can flex
some ‘‘intellectual muscle’’ and show that new ideas do emerge in this field while making
others aware of the risk of going too far for its own sake.
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